More than 55% of residents in the Havukoski district are foreign-language speakers, an example of rapid demographic change in the Helsinki region.
Foreign language speakers by language
Population pyramid by background
Subsidy dependency by origin
Refugee countries: Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria · Middle East: Middle East & North Africa excl. refugee countries, incl. Central Asia · Eastern Europe: Eastern European countries · Western countries: EU/EEA, North America, Australia & similar · Other countries: All remaining foreign countries
Economic contribution by origin group
Refugee countries: Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria · Middle East: Middle East & North Africa excl. refugee countries, incl. Central Asia · Eastern Europe: Eastern European countries · Western countries: EU/EEA, North America, Australia & similar · Other countries: All remaining foreign countries
Unemployment rate by nationality
Share outside labour force by citizenship group
Crime rates by nationality
Net migration by birth country
Sources and notes
Knowledge base
This page collects public statistics and research on migration, integration, crime, welfare, and demographics. The material is intended for policy and social analysis, not for drawing conclusions about individuals or population groups. Migrants are a large and highly diverse group of people with very different backgrounds and reasons for moving. The aim is not to characterize the group as a whole, but to highlight the partially negative effects associated with certain types of immigration to the country.
🇫🇷 France
mafrance.app is a French site documenting immigration-related incidents on an interactive map, conceptually similar to this site. It illustrates how much further the same development has progressed in France: thousands of incidents have been collected across the country, and their density shows the scale of the phenomenon. Finland is clearly behind France in this development, but the statistics and cases point in the same direction.
🇸🇪 Sweden
migrationskartan.se is a Swedish site mapping immigration-related incidents and statistics in Sweden. Sweden has taken in substantially more immigrants than Finland relative to population size, and the consequences — crime, segregation, and strain on the welfare system — are only at an earlier stage in Finland. The Swedish example acts as an early warning of where the same policies lead.
la.stnight.in is a site documenting immigration-related incidents in Sweden — conceptually similar to this site. Sweden has taken in substantially more immigrants than Finland relative to its population size, and the range of incidents gives a concrete picture of how the same development is progressing in our closest neighbour.
demografie-europa.eu is a German-language demographic research portal providing interactive maps of population change, migration, and age structure across Europe at regional level. The maps visualise how immigration is reshaping the demographic composition of European countries and regions, giving a continent-wide perspective on the same trends visible in Finland.
🇬🇧 United Kingdom
Vuoden 2021 väestölaskennan interaktiivinen kartta (ONS), joka osoittaa valkoisen brittiväestön (englanti, wales, skotlanti, pohjoisirlanti) osuuden alueittain. Havainnollistaa kantaväestön vähentymisen ja vähemmistöaseman suurissa kaupungeissa kuten Lontoossa, Leicesterissä ja Birminghamissa.
Migration Central (Centre for Migration Control) is a UK-based Substack publication tracking the impact of migration through statistics and individual cases — covering benefit claims, NHS registrations, arrests, and small-boat crossings. A significant share of the UK case material in this knowledge base is sourced from this site.
🇪🇸 Spain
datosinmigracion.es is a Spanish demographic platform visualising the foreign-born population across Spain as an interactive map. Data covers 1998–2025 and can be filtered by country of origin, province, gender, and age group. Spain is one of Europe's fastest-growing immigration countries — a dramatic rise in sexual violence (+332% over a decade) has been documented in official Eurostat statistics.
🇳🇱 Netherlands
Nederland in Beeld compiles official statistics on the societal impact of immigration in the Netherlands. The site presents daily-updated figures on prison populations, welfare use, crime suspects, housing allocation, and costs — sourced from CBS StatLine, IND, COA, and court databases. The Netherlands is one of Europe's best-documented examples of where mass immigration leads.
🇳🇴 Norway
Statistics Norway's (SSB) interactive map of the share of people with an immigrant background by municipality. The Oslo area stands out clearly — the map gives Nordic-scale context for where Finland is heading.
🇩🇰 Denmark
Statistics Denmark's official section on immigrants and their descendants. Covers population trends, countries of origin, and residential distribution. Denmark has tightened its immigration policy more sharply than most Nordic countries — the statistics show why.
Statistics Denmark's interactive map of the share of people with an immigrant background by municipality. Illustrates the geographic concentration and uneven distribution of demographic change across Denmark.
🇦🇹 Austria
Statistik Austria's official interactive atlas maps the distribution of the population by citizenship across Austria. Based on official population register data, it shows how the foreign-national population is concentrated in Vienna and other urban centres. Austria admitted a large number of asylum seekers relative to its size during the 2010s — the statistics provide a comparison point for Finland.
🇩🇪 Germany
messerinzidenz.de is a German site documenting knife attacks and blade crime across Germany on a case-by-case map. It collects incidents from news sources and visualises their geographic distribution. Knife crime in Germany has risen significantly alongside increased immigration.
Official interactive map from Germany's Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) showing the share of people with a migration background by district (Landkreis). Germany admitted over a million asylum seekers in 2015–2016 and has by far the largest immigrant population in the EU — the regional distribution shown here illustrates the long-term demographic consequences of large-scale migration.
demografie-europa.eu is a German-language demographic research portal providing interactive maps of population change, migration, and age structure across Europe at regional level. The maps visualise how immigration is reshaping the demographic composition of European countries and regions, giving a continent-wide perspective on the same trends visible in Finland.
Demographic change
The population structure of Finland and Europe is changing faster than public debate often suggests, driven by immigration and birth-rate differences. The statistics below show the scale of the change in Finland and how it compares with the rest of Europe.
The number of people with foreign background in Finland has grown from about 37,600 (1990) to over 660,800 (2025). Most of the growth is still foreign-born, but the number of Finland-born people with foreign background (second generation) has also grown fast, passing 100,000 in 2025.
Tilastot-sivu: Väestörakenteen muutos
Finland
- 2000–2025 is Statistics Finland's realised population statistics. From 2025 onward (dashed), the chart projects current fertility, mortality and net migration forward unchanged — it shows where today's trends would lead if they continued. It is not an official Statistics Finland forecast.
- The calculation combines five Statistics Finland datasets: age structure by background, total fertility rate by background, the whole population's fertility age shape, the national survivorship curve, and net migration.
- The migrant age distribution is based on Finnish Immigration Service (Migri) statistics on first residence permits, 2021–2025: about 18% under 14, 4% aged 14–17, 51% aged 18–34, 27% aged 35–64, and under 1% over 65.
- Fertility is distributed across ages using the whole population's age shape (not background-specific), scaled to each group's own total fertility rate (native-background 1.23 and foreign-background 1.39 in 2024).
- Mortality uses a single national life-expectancy curve, since Statistics Finland does not publish mortality broken down by background.
- Net migration is held constant at the 2019–2023 average (about 30,900 people/year).
- Statistics Finland classifies a child as Finnish-background as soon as at least one parent was born in Finland. Since no data on the rate of mixed-background partnerships is available, the model does not apply this reclassification and keeps every child in its mother's background group instead — so the real trend would likely move slower than this chart shows.
- Because every current rate is held fixed for the whole horizon, the chart shows what continuing today's trends would imply, not a prediction of what will actually happen.
The cities of Espoo, Helsinki and Vantaa together with the Regional Council of Uusimaa published a forecast of Uusimaa's foreign-language population for 2022–2040 in August 2023. The chart's figures come from the report's appendix table, which covers all of Uusimaa. The forecast projects the total foreign-language population growing from about 53,000 (2000) to over 554,000 (2040) – more than tenfold. The largest group, other Asian languages, would grow from 7,474 to 121,641. The group covers languages spoken in Asia outside the Middle East; the biggest are Chinese, Vietnamese, Thai, Filipino (Tagalog), Nepali and Bengali. Middle Eastern languages such as Arabic and Persian form their own group together with North African languages. Realised statistics run through 2021; everything from 2022 onward — including years that have since passed — is the report's own projection, not measured data. The vertical line marks the report's publication year, 2023. Actual population growth in 2022–2025 has already exceeded the report's projections, as immigration to Finland has been at record highs in those years.
The foreign-background population is markedly younger than the Finnish-background population – 12.2% of it falls in the 35–39 age band, versus just 6.0% for the same age band among the Finnish-background population. Because of this, its population share would keep growing to some extent even without further immigration, while the Finnish-background population skews increasingly older and barely grows on its own anymore. Finland's population growth today comes almost entirely from immigration, and this difference in age structure only accelerates the pace of demographic change.
Births and fertility
Alongside migration, fertility drives demographic change. Fertility has fallen steeply in both groups: the total fertility rate of Finnish-background women dropped from 1.77 (1990) to 1.23 (2024) and of foreign-background women from 2.61 to 1.39 – the gap has narrowed but not disappeared. Because the foreign-background population is young and growing, its share of newborns is nevertheless rising fast: 1.3% (1990) → 17.9% (2024), well above its population share.
The share of newborns with a foreign-background mother has grown 14-fold since 1990. Over the same period total births fell from 65,500 to 43,700, and only 35,900 children were born to Finnish-background mothers in 2024 (64,700 in 1990).
Articles on demographic change in Finland
There were 660,800 people with foreign background at the end of 2025, or 11.7% of the population. According to calculations by Professor Matti Viren, the current growth rate would produce 11.8 million by 2060, more than the estimated 4.5 million with Finnish background.
At Kirsti school in Espoo, 92% of the roughly 450 pupils speak a foreign first language, and 55 different native languages are spoken (Albanian the most common, then English). Across Espoo about 32% of pupils speak something other than Finnish, Swedish or Sámi as their first language, and in eight Espoo schools the foreign-language share exceeds 50%. The principal calls the school's multiculturalism a genuine asset, but also notes that once the share of foreign-language children passed 40–50%, Finnish-speaking parents began considering moving their child to another school.
In 2025 a record 14,168 foreigners were granted Finnish citizenship — an all-time high, +23% on the previous year. The largest group was Iraqis (14% of the total). Naturalisation was tightened at the same time: the required residence period was extended from 5 to 8 years.
Helsingin Sanomat published a calculation suggesting the number of descendants of today's Finnish-background population could fall from about 5 million to under 1 million by 2113 at the current fertility rate (1.25). It was a thought experiment by Heikki Bergholm — not a scientific study — based on 2022 birth data (~38,600 births to the native-background population) and an unchanged 81-year life expectancy.
Statistics Finland population projection 2021 (medium scenario): the foreign-language population share is projected to grow from its current ~11–12% to approximately 18–20% by 2040. Since actual net migration in 2022–2025 significantly exceeded the medium-scenario assumptions, the real share may be higher.
Independent statistics site tracking Finland's population change. It functions independently and is not a link to the main site.
Europe
The foreign-born share of the population has risen rapidly in most of Western Europe over the past 15 years. In Germany it went from 12.0% to 20.5% and in Sweden from 14.3% to 20.8% between 2010 and 2025. Greece is the exception, where the share held steady.
Demographic change is sometimes labelled a conspiracy theory. Regardless of the label, population statistics show substantial demographic change.
Muslim population growth
Pew Research Center's country table estimated Finland's Muslim share at 2.7% in 2016. Its 2050 scenarios are 4.2% with no new migration, 11.4% in the medium scenario and 15.0% in the high-migration scenario. Current estimates vary, but the claim that the share remains permanently tiny does not survive Pew's model.
Finland
- Registered members of Islamic communities: approximately 20,876 (0.37% of the population).
- Estimated actual Muslim population: 120,000–130,000 — many times the registered figure.
- Largest Muslim communities: Helsinki Metropolitan Area, Turku, Tampere.
- Muslims are the fastest-growing religious group in Finland.
International
- Pew estimated Europe's Muslim population at 25.8 million in 2016, or 4.9% of the population.
- Even with no further migration, the Muslim share would rise to 7.4% by 2050 because of age structure and fertility.
- In the medium scenario the share would be 11.2%, and in the high-migration scenario it would be 14.0% in 2050.
- Among migrants who arrived in Europe between 2010 and 2016, an estimated 53% were Muslim; among those granted or expected to be granted refugee status, 78% were Muslim.
- The median age of Muslims was 30.4 years versus 43.8 for non-Muslims; the total fertility rate was 2.6 children for Muslim women and 1.6 for non-Muslim women.
- Finland scenario: Pew estimated the Muslim share at 2.7% in 2016; for 2050 the zero-migration scenario is 4.2%, the medium scenario 11.4% and the high scenario 15.0%.
Kokoelma arvioita ja uutisia muslimien väestöosuuden kasvusta eri Euroopan maissa. Luvut ovat lähteidensä mukaisia arvioita ja projektioita – osa akateemisia, osa uutis- tai näkökulmamediaa – ja tulokset riippuvat voimakkaasti syntyvyys- ja muuttoliikeoletuksista. Perusteellisin näistä on yllä esitetty Pew Research Centerin Euroopan laajuinen skenaario.
The European Conservative reports Dutch demographer Jan Latten's estimate: Muslims would grow from about one million today (~6%) to 3–4 million by 2050 (~20% of a 20-million population). The estimate assumes migration continues at the current rate; it is one expert's projection, not an official forecast.
Jerusalem Post: Church of Norway membership fell from 85% (1994) to 62% (2024). Registered Muslim membership grew from 72,000 (2006) to an estimated 197,000+ (2025), about +174%.
Hyphen: Europe's Muslim population is younger and higher-fertility than the wider population, which slows ageing and raises the Muslim share even without new migration — the same mechanism as Pew's zero-migration scenario.
A peer-reviewed article (Pierre & Alexandra Rostan, PSU Research Review 2019) uses wavelet analysis to project a Muslim majority in 13 European countries between 2085 (Cyprus) and 2215 (Lithuania) — e.g. Sweden 2125, France 2135, UK 2180. It assumes higher fertility (~1 more child per woman) and 2017-level migration (~706,000 asylum seekers/yr, 86% Muslim). The authors themselves stress that a 200-year extrapolation is highly uncertain and sensitive to policy and migration changes.
SWI swissinfo.ch, drawing on Pew data: Switzerland's Muslim population was 6.1% (500,000) in 2016. With zero migration the share would rise to 8.2% (660,000) by 2050, to 10.3% (1,140,000) in the medium scenario, and to 12.9% (1,500,000) in the high scenario. Muslims are on average 13 years younger than other Europeans; Pew assumed a fertility rate of 2.1 for Muslims versus 1.5 for others.
Integration
Integration can be measured from many angles: the effectiveness of integration measures, school outcomes, residential segregation, partner choice and the sharing of civic obligations. Whatever the measure, the differences between background groups are large and narrow slowly.
Integration policy: costs and effectiveness
Finland spends hundreds of millions of euros a year on immigrant integration — mostly as state compensations to municipalities and wellbeing services counties, plus integration training and integration plans. The key question is how much of that spending helps: the evidence shows that individual low-cost measures are cost-effective, but integration outcomes — employment and language skills — remain weak in international comparison.
Finland
- Public funding for integration consists mainly of state compensations paid to municipalities and wellbeing services counties, plus integration training and integration plans. State-budget compensations for promoting integration were about €279 million (2023) and about €384 million (2024); compensation specifically for the reception and integration of people receiving international protection came to about €137 million paid to municipalities in 2020.
- The calculated per-person compensation to a municipality was €6,845/year for a child under school age (0–6) and €2,300/year for a person aged 7 or over (2024 level), paid for 3 years — 4 years for quota refugees.
- Effectiveness: according to VATT, receiving an individual integration plan raised an immigrant's earned income by more than €20,000 on average over ten years and cut benefit transfers by about €8,000 — work income rose 47% with virtually no extra cost (Sarvimäki & Hämäläinen; VATT).
- So one low-cost measure has proven cost-effective, but integration outcomes — employment and language skills — remain weak in international comparison: on OECD measures the employment gap between the native- and foreign-background population is among the widest in the Nordics and the whole OECD, and fewer than half of immigrants are proficient in a domestic language (EU average 62%) (OECD Settling In 2023; Economic Survey Finland 2025).
- The same 1999 integration-plan reform increased adult immigrants' language training and improved their labour-market position — and the benefit reached their children too.
- A parent's participation raised the children's school grades by 0.5 standard deviations and kept them in education more than a year longer.
- Two decades after arrival, children of the immigrants covered by the policy earned 42% more than children whose parents narrowly missed it — the strongest evidence of integration's long-run, second-generation payoff.
- Of those who completed integration training in 2013–2016, just under 35% reached language level B1 — roughly two in three fell short of the target.
- The audit's core finding: the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment did not have enough information on how integration training affects immigrants' language skills or employment.
- The only effectiveness metric the ministry tracked — jobseeker status three months after training — was judged inadequate: the unemployment rate alone says nothing about the training's effectiveness.
- The 2022 follow-up found monitoring had improved in line with the recommendations, but credible impact evaluation remains hard because reliable employment data exist only in Statistics Finland's registers.
- The integration-training language courses delivered weak results: in 2016 more than four in five participants failed to reach B1.1 (the level needed for vocational training) and close to 60% failed to reach even A2.2; 28% ended up at beginner level or below.
- In 2015, close to two in five integration-training participants fell into unemployment or left the labour force at the end of their training.
- Foreign-born women's employment rate trailed comparable native-born women by 51.5 percentage points in year one (28.8 pp for men) and still by 40 pp five years after arrival — narrowing to about 20 pp only after 15 years.
- The OECD cites Sarvimäki & Hämäläinen: the 1999 integration plans significantly increased immigrants' employment and earnings and reduced their dependency on social benefits.
- The 1999 integration law (the individual integration plan) offers a rare causal design: the reform applied only to immigrants who arrived after 1 May 1997, allowing a comparison of those who landed just either side of the cut-off.
- For those covered by a plan, cumulative earned income rose 47% and social benefits paid fell 13% over a ten-year follow-up.
- Immigrants arriving after the cut-off were 35 percentage points more likely to receive an integration plan and earned about €7,000 more during the 2000s; the local average treatment effect was therefore roughly €21,000.
- The effect was achieved with no new money and no increase in training days — content was shifted from generic job-search courses toward language and immigrant-specific training. It was a more efficient use of existing resources.
EU-harmonised integration-outcome indicators show the same picture across several domains: the foreign-born trail the native population in education, housing and material well-being. The indicators are Eurostat sample surveys (EU-SILC / LFS) with a coarse split (native- vs foreign-born) and no fine origin groups; because the foreign-born subsample is small, the figures fluctuate year to year. Self-reported health is the exception: there the foreign-born report better health than natives, largely because of their younger age structure (the 'healthy migrant' effect), not genuinely better health.
Education
The PISA 2022 study reveals a substantial learning gap between immigrant-background and native pupils. The gap does not disappear in the second generation. Where the gap appears to narrow, part of the explanation is weaker native results, not only improvement among immigrant pupils.
Employment improves markedly with time in Finland, but especially slowly for immigrant women: their employment starts very low and only catches up to men's level after several years.
Early school leaving is markedly more common among foreign-born youth than among the native population. The gap is moderate by EU standards, but combined with weaker learning outcomes (PISA) and lower tertiary completion it foreshadows more persistent divergence in education and labour-market pathways.
Suomi · PISA 2022: 58 % ensimmäisen sukupolven maahanmuuttajaoppilaista jäi alle matematiikan perustason (kantaväestö 22 %). Lukemisessa 61 % alle perustason. Kuilu näkyy myös toisessa sukupolvessa (43 % / 39 %).
First-generation immigrants in Finland fall about 105 points behind the native population on the PIAAC literacy scale — the largest gap of any PIAAC participating country. The gap narrows to about 51 points when the immigrant speaks Finnish or Swedish at home and has lived in Finland for at least 5 years. 83% of TE-services experts say poor literacy has led to a jobseeker being rejected.
Residential segregation
The share of the foreign-background population is 19–25% in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. At neighbourhood level the gap is sharper: eastern and north-eastern Helsinki concentrates significantly more of the foreign-background population. Segregation is increasing.
Map view: Foreign-background share (%) — by postal code (2014 and 2024)
Peer-reviewed study: ethnic and socioeconomic segregation has grown in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area during the 2000s. Children's segregation is stronger than that of their parents. Helsinki has sought to prevent slum formation by mixing housing stock, but the trend in segregation is nonetheless upward.
A tool published by Suomen Perusta presenting area-level figures based on Statistics Finland register data for Helsinki (77 primary-school catchment areas), Espoo and Vantaa: foreign-background population share, ARA subsidised rental housing, uptake of income support and housing assistance, employment, income levels, municipal tax paid, and education level — broken down by origin group (e.g. major refugee-origin countries, Middle East, Eastern Europe, Western countries) versus the native population. Population trends go back to 1990, other indicators mostly to 2022. Illustrates how segregation and integration gaps are distributed geographically at the neighbourhood level.
Vantaa: 25% of residents are foreign-background — the highest in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. Espoo: 22%. Helsinki: about 19–20% (over 134,000 people). Across Finland, foreign-background residents are about 9–10% of the population.
Partner choice and mixed-background couples
Partner choice is one of the most concrete measures of integration. The share paired with a Finnish-background partner varies enormously by background country: a clear majority of couples with a Thai, Swedish or other Western background include a Finnish-background partner, whereas among refugee-origin groups (Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq) the share stays below a quarter. The pattern reflects both the reason for migration (marriage migration vs. refuge) and community size and in-group marriage.
Both mixed couples and all-foreign-background couples have grown fast. Finnish–foreign-background couples numbered about 21,000 in 1992 and 71,000 in 2023. Couples where both partners have a foreign background grew even more steeply — from about 4,700 to nearly 80,000 (a 17-fold rise) — and in 2022, for the first time, such couples outnumbered mixed couples. Meanwhile the share of foreign-background people's couples that are with a Finnish-background partner fell from 82% (1992) to 47% (2023): as communities grow, more people marry within their own background group.
Military service evasion
Foreign-language men avoid military service at significantly higher rates than Finnish-language men. The pattern raises questions about integration and the equal distribution of civic obligations.
According to Captain Lauri J. Mattila, 75% of Somali-speaking and 57% of Arabic-speaking conscripts failed to attend call-ups in the Uusimaa region, and 70% of these groups received exemptions on health grounds. The Defence Forces deny breaking down conscripts by mother tongue. The Conscripts' Union considers the underrepresentation worrying for both national defence capability and fairness.
Ilta-Sanomat article on the avoidance of military service among foreign-language men in Finland. Foreign-language men miss call-ups or seek exemption more often than Finnish-speakers.
Sotilasaikakauslehti article examines the situation of foreign-language conscripts, call-up participation and integration challenges from the perspective of the Defence Forces.
Economic effects
Immigration is often defended through labour supply and public-finance benefits. Labour migration can be economically positive, but register data and fiscal models show that the same is not true for every migration reason or origin. Humanitarian and family migration in particular show up in the data as higher benefit use and a weaker tax base.
Tilastot-sivu: Taloudellinen panos syntyperäryhmittäin
Finland
Compared with native-background residents of a similar age and sex distribution. Positive = net contributor (pays more in taxes than it receives in transfers); negative = receives more in transfers than it pays. Work-based migration is the only clearly positive group.
Includes collectively consumed public services, so the figures are more negative than net income transfers alone (excluding collective services: Somalia ≈ −€7,900, native-born ≈ +€3,400, Germany ≈ +€5,100). For Finland the 95% confidence interval is shown: −173…+339 €. A negative figure means the group received more in public spending than it paid in taxes.
- Nettotulonsiirtojen keskiarvo muuton syyn / oleskeluluvan mukaan vuonna 2023 (positiivinen = nettomaksaja, maksaa enemmän veroja kuin saa tulonsiirtoja; negatiivinen = saa nettona enemmän tulonsiirtoja kuin maksaa):
- Työ: +971 € — ainoa selvästi positiivinen ryhmä, jopa hieman vertailukelpoisia kantasuomalaisia parempi.
- Suomessa syntynyt −728 €, EU-oleskeluoikeus −3 593 €, opiskelu −3 623 €, kansalaisuus −4 040 €.
- Pysyvä oleskelulupa −5 874 €, muu/tuntematon −6 852 €, perhe −9 989 €.
- Suojelu (humanitaarinen) −18 537 € — selvästi negatiivisin ryhmä.
- Ero syntyy ennen kaikkea muuton syystä: työperäinen muutto on fiskaalisesti lähellä nollaa tai positiivinen, humanitaarinen ja perheperusteinen selvästi negatiivisia. Kokonaiskuva on vähemmän negatiivinen, kun huomioidaan ulkomaalaistaustaisten nuorempi ikärakenne. Graafin on koonnut myös HS (Minttu Linjala).
- In Finland (Pesola et al. 2024a) the residence-permit basis is decisive for employment: work-based immigrants have an employment rate above 80% already in year one; EU citizens go from about 60% to 80% over ten years; students from about 25% to 70%; family-tie immigrants from about 10% to 70%; and those granted international protection from about 10% to 60%.
- Income gaps outlast the employment gaps: those granted international protection earn only about 3% of the native Finnish-background income level in their first full year, still under half after ten years.
- About 17% of immigrants leave Finland again within ten years — nearly a quarter of students, but only about 8% of those granted protection.
- Finland's own register data (Salminen 2015) confirms the direction of the Suomen Perusta report: in 2011 the net fiscal impact of German-born immigrants was clearly positive — even higher than for the native-born — while Somali- and Iraqi-born immigrants had a markedly negative impact.
- Sweden's long-run data (Konjunkturinstitutet 2025a) puts the same pattern in numbers: refugees' net fiscal impact averages SEK –27,500 per person per year (SEK –22bn for the group as a whole) and turns positive only after about 15 years of residence; only about 40% of working-age refugees are ever net contributors, versus over 50% for other foreign-born and over 70% for the native-born.
- Integration policy has a measurable payoff: Finland's 1999 individual integration plan raised participants' cumulative ten-year earned income by 47% and cut paid social benefits by 13% (Sarvimäki & Hämäläinen, 2016).
- VATT (Finland's Government Institute for Economic Research) is currently studying the overall fiscal impact of immigration.
- Results are expected no earlier than 2027.
- The study covers direct costs (reception, integration, social security) as well as tax revenue and labour-market effects.
- Earlier VATT estimate: about €–520 per person per year, totalling ~€107M/year — but this does not capture lifecycle effects.
- Vahtera's estimate of the annual total cost of immigration: about €3.2 billion.
- The calculation accounts for social security, healthcare, education and administrative costs in relation to the taxes paid by immigrant groups.
- Somalia: net contribution excluding all services €–7,900 per person; total net effect as low as €–13,850 per person.
- Iraq: similarly strongly negative.
- Immigrants from Western countries (Germany, Sweden) are close to zero or positive.
- Discounted lifecycle calculation: an immigrant from Somalia €–951,000 (without children), with children up to €–1,343,000.
- An immigrant from Iraq: €–690,000 (without children), with children €–844,000.
- In 2020 immigrant-background residents caused a municipal tax-base shortfall of about €644 million.
- Labour-based immigration (from Western Europe) is close to zero or positive.
Europe
- Immigration cost the Dutch public sector about EUR 400 billion net in 1995-2019, averaging about EUR 17 billion per year and peaking at EUR 32 billion in 2016.
- Immigrants use more social security, education, and other benefits than the native population and pay less in taxes and social-security contributions.
- The net effect is negative for every immigration category: work, study, asylum, and family. Asylum seekers and family migrants are the most expensive.
- The results were calculated using generational accounting: all income and expenditure from immigration to death or return migration.
The Helsingin Sanomat guest column and article ask whether immigration endangers the long-term sustainability of the pension system. Lower employment among immigrants and a higher probability of receiving benefits weaken the system's funding base.
Helsingin Sanomat guest column: immigrants' lower employment rate and higher benefit use weaken the long-term funding base of the pension system.
Helsingin Sanomat article: the pension-contribution accumulation of immigrant groups is clearly lower than that of the native population, weakening the system's net balance. Entitlement to the guarantee pension and national pension arises after three years of residence in Finland, and the full guarantee pension is about €990 per month.
Refers to the same Suomen Perusta report used in the page's own chart. Finland is described as the clearest European case showing that immigration does not economically compensate for population ageing. The article says Finland now gets about 50,000 new arrivals a year, and per the OECD, about half of 2024 arrivals came for family reunification. As a comparison it cites Minnesota, where 81% of Somali-immigrant households use some federal welfare vs. 21% of native households.
Yle article on the economic effects of immigration in Finland.
54% of Arabic speakers receive basic social assistance — Kela's last-resort benefit. Among Finnish or Swedish speakers the rate is only 3.7%. Foreign-language speakers make up roughly 9–10% of the population but account for around 30% of all social assistance recipients.
Welfare use by background
According to Kela's official statistics, foreign-language speakers are about 10% of the population but 29.4% of basic-social-assistance recipients (2024, up from roughly 19% in 2017) and receive about 37% of the money paid — over €300 million of a ~€825 million total. Differences between language groups are large: the charts page shows Arabic-speaking groups receiving basic social assistance at roughly 15 times the rate of Finnish or Swedish speakers.
Charts: Subsidy dependency by origin
Last year Kela detected more than 1,000 suspected benefit misuses worth about €7 million. 471 investigation requests were filed with police. In Sweden Försäkringskassan prevented incorrect payments worth €877.5 million in 2024; Finland recovers about €110 million in incorrect payments. Minister Grahn-Laasonen: 'what is possible in Sweden is possible in Finland' — organised crime systematically exploits social security.
The unemployment rate of the foreign-background population (aged 20–64) was 16.7% in 2024, while for Finnish-background residents it was 6.6%. The ratio is 2.5×. Foreign-background unemployment was at its highest after the pandemic in 2022, when it briefly dropped to 11.5%.
Kelan virallisen tilaston mukaan vieraskielisten osuus perustoimeentulotuen saajista oli 29,4 % vuonna 2024 (2017: noin 19 %). Vieraskielisille maksettiin noin 37 % tuesta — yli 300 miljoonaa euroa, kun perustoimeentulotukea maksettiin kaikkiaan noin 825 miljoonaa euroa. Kela raportoi vieraskieliset yhtenä ryhmänä eikä julkaise kielikohtaisia osuuksia virallisesti; kielikohtainen erittely (ks. seuraava lähde) perustuu Kelan erillistoimitukseen.
54% of Arabic speakers receive basic social assistance — Kela's last-resort benefit. Among Finnish or Swedish speakers the rate is only 3.7%. Foreign-language speakers make up roughly 9–10% of the population but account for around 30% of all social assistance recipients.
Remittances abroad
Remittances are a billion-scale outflow from Finland. Official statistics cover only formal channels; informal systems such as hawala are treated in authority risk assessments as high-risk channels for money laundering and terrorist financing. This lowers the economic contribution people of foreign background make to society, since part of what they earn leaves the country instead of feeding the local economy — in a sense, extra development aid that never shows up in the state budget.
Unofficial transfers remain hidden.
On 8 Feb 2024 the Finnish Government adopted a resolution (VM/2024/27) partially updating the national money-laundering and terrorist-financing risk assessment and action plan. Unregistered hawala operators were added to the action plan for the first time, with the associated money-laundering and terrorist-financing risk assessed as significant. The Financial Intelligence Unit, supervisors, reporting-obligated entities and other authorities are cooperating to identify unregistered hawala operators and pursue criminal liability. This is Finland's own official assessment, unlike the page's other hawala sources, which cover Swedish authorities' risk classification.
Criminality
This site documents crime statistics and the overrepresentation of immigrant-background groups in them extensively. The graph below shows the overrepresentation of sexual and violent crime among immigrant groups: it brings together the overrepresentation found in the crime statistics of five comparison countries and calculates an average for each country of origin. Combining the averages across all countries, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan show the highest overrepresentation in sexual offences, while Tunisia, Somalia and Iraq top the list for violent crime. Finland's legal definition of sexual offences differs somewhat from the other countries, so the true overrepresentation may be even more significant.
Charts: Criminality by nationality in Finland
Crime also runs the other way: foreign-background people are overrepresented as victims too. Relative to population, assault victims are about twice as common in the foreign-background population as in the native one (2025: 126 vs. 69 victims per 10,000). For sexual offences, victimisation is roughly equally common in both groups (2025: 12.7 vs. 12.6 per 10,000) – in sharp contrast to the suspect statistics, where the overrepresentation of major refugee-origin countries is many-fold.
A common counter-argument is that foreign residents' crime overrepresentation is merely an artefact of a young, male-skewed age structure. Standardisation narrows the gap markedly, but does not remove it. Using Statistics Finland data (suspects 13yy + population 11rg, permanent residents, 2024), directly standardised for age and sex, foreign residents' total crime falls from a crude ~×1.5 to ~×1.2 vs natives — age and sex explain about two-thirds of the gap. For property offences the standardised level for all foreign residents drops even below the native baseline (~×0.9). For violent and sexual offences, however, the gap stays many times higher even after standardisation: ~×1.6 for violence and ~×1.8 for sexual offences across all foreign residents, and far higher for major refugee-origin countries — e.g. Iraq violent ~×6–7 and sexual offences ~×9 vs natives. The same standardisation can be toggled on in the crime chart in the Charts view via the 'Age & sex standardised' option. The figures are suspects, not convictions.
The Rikollisuustilanne 2024 review standardises crime-suspect rates using Eurostat's European Standard Population (a different method from the site's own direct age/sex standardisation of StatFin tables). In 2024 the age-standardised non-traffic crime rate was 839 per 10,000 for the foreign-background population vs. 465 for the Finnish-background population — a ~1.8× gap that persists after standardisation. For assault, the standardised rate was about 70% higher for the foreign-background population; for sexual offences, more than 1.5× higher.
Lähdetaulu, josta ikä- ja sukupuolivakiointi lasketaan: epäillyt kansalaisuus × ikä × sukupuoli, yhdistettynä väestötauluun 11rg. Suora vakiointi koko maan ikä- ja sukupuolirakenteeseen.
In 2018, 297,600 crime suspects were identified, of whom 34,200 were foreign nationals. Age- and gender-standardised suspicion index: foreign nationals were suspected 1.2x more often than Finnish nationals. Iraqi men were suspected of sexual offences 12.8x more often than Finnish men (2017–2018 combined). Somali men were suspected of drug offences 3.4x more often; Swedish women of property crimes 3.1x more often. Iraqis overall 2.0x, Swedes 2.3x. Figures represent suspicions, not convictions.
According to the Rikollisuustilanne 2024 review, non-traffic crime committed by immigrants (foreign nationals resident in Finland) has grown roughly 70% since 2015, mostly explained by growth in the foreign-background population — the population-adjusted rate has grown far more modestly. Theft offences rose 40% and assault offences 50% (raw counts, not standardised). In 2024, people with a foreign background made up 19% of non-traffic crime suspects and 17% of traffic offence suspects. By crime type, the foreign-background share was highest in smuggling (32%), rape (32%) and tax offences (30%).
Between 2015 and 2024, police recorded over 77,000 crime victims with a foreign background in total; the annual count grew from 5,400 (2015) to 11,439 (2024). Averaged over the decade, people with a foreign background made up about 14% of all police-recorded crime victims. The share was highest in violence and threat offences: assault and unlawful threats averaged 15%, stalking 15%, robbery and rape 12%.
The share of foreign suspects and offenders in serious narcotics cases investigated by the National Bureau of Investigation (KRP) rose from 53% in 2024 to 79% in 2025, KRP intelligence chief Jaakko Christensen said in a Rikospaikka interview. The figures cover the most serious cases KRP investigates, often linked to organised crime — not all drug offences. By nationality, Swedes have risen to the top of KRP's drug cases and are the second-largest group across all serious drug crimes, after Estonians. KRP's priorities include organised crime, street gangs and Swedish organised crime; youth violent crime has also been rising since 2015.
In 2018, 297,600 crime suspects were identified, of whom 34,200 were foreign nationals. Age- and gender-standardised suspicion index: foreign nationals were suspected 1.2x more often than Finnish nationals. Iraqi men were suspected of sexual offences 12.8x more often than Finnish men (2017–2018 combined). Somali men were suspected of drug offences 3.4x more often; Swedish women of property crimes 3.1x more often. Iraqis overall 2.0x, Swedes 2.3x. Figures represent suspicions, not convictions.
Statistics Finland's analysis of crime suspects by nationality, age- and sex-standardised (2017–2018): foreigners were suspected of criminal-code offences at 1.2× the rate of Finns. Iraqi men: 12.8× overrepresentation in sexual offences. Somali men: 3.4× overrepresentation in narcotics offences. Iraqi-background persons: 2.0× in overall criminality.
Peer-reviewed study: immigrant youth have a higher crime rate in 14 of 17 measured offence types. The gap is smallest for shoplifting, vandalism and bullying. No significant difference in substance use.
Violent crime
Homicide and knife-crime statistics across Europe show consistent overrepresentation of foreign nationals. In Germany, nearly one in two violent crime suspects is a foreigner. Stabbing attacks, vehicle rammings, and gang violence are disproportionately linked to recently arrived migrant groups.
Finland
The National Bureau of Investigation (KRP) report on youth violent crime highlights an increase in aggravated robberies and homicides committed by minors after 2015. Between 2015 and 2020, youths with a foreign background were suspected of violent crimes 2.8 times more often than those with a native background (7.0 vs. 2.5 suspects per 1,000 residents). For 15–17-year-olds, the suspect rate was 28.3 for the foreign-born, 21.1 for Finland-born youths with a foreign background, and 7.9 for native-background youths per 1,000 residents. The share of foreign-background suspects among all minors suspected of violent crimes rose from 18% in 2015 to 23% in 2020.
Yle discusses the criteria for reporting the ethnic background of suspects. According to the police, a subset of foreign-background youths in the Helsinki metropolitan area carry weapons and are quick to use them. Statistics Finland reports that approximately one in five (20%) suspects in aggravated robberies under the age of 21 has a foreign background.
Violent crimes committed by persons with a foreign background are common in Helsinki, with the group being clearly overrepresented in police statistics. In the 2000s, suspects with a foreign background accounted for over 40% of rapes and nearly a third of robberies and extortions reported to the Helsinki police.
The article is from 2008, but the pattern it describes has continued to hold true ever since – see also the more recent National Bureau of Investigation report below.
Sexual crimes
Foreign-background persons are substantially overrepresented in sexual offence statistics across Europe. Eurostat data show a 150% rise in reported sexual violence offences across the EU between 2014 and 2024. In Sweden, 63% of convicted rapists have a migrant background.
Per Statistics Finland's crime and coercive measures statistics, 364 of 1,080 (33.7%) rape/aggravated rape suspects in 2025 were of foreign background, up from 281 of 893 (31.5%) in 2024. Over the same period the foreign-background share of the total population was 11.7% — roughly a threefold overrepresentation among suspects, a share that has risen steadily throughout the 2000s.
Suspected sexual offences by taxi drivers in Helsinki multiplied after taxi deregulation (from 2 reports in 2017 to nearly 50 in 2023–2024). According to Helsinki police, the suspected drivers have without exception been of foreign background.
IS investigation of 2018 sexual offence convictions in Helsinki and Oulu: out of 82 convicted individuals, 43 (52.4%) were of foreign background. In Helsinki, 40 foreign-background and 31 native Finns were convicted; in Oulu, 3 foreign-background and 8 native Finns.
Property crime
Youths with a foreign background are significantly overrepresented among suspects for robbery offences in Finland. Statistics Finland's data highlight backgrounds from Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Asia among the suspects.
Table 2 of the Rikollisuustilanne 2024 review breaks down the crime rate of men aged 18–29 by region of origin (2015–2024 average, suspects per 10,000 population). The lowest property- and violent-crime rates are found among those with East Asian backgrounds, the highest among those with North African backgrounds. For sexual offences, the lowest rates are among East Asian backgrounds and the highest among those representing Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Asia. Differences in traffic offences are generally small, except for men with Western Asian backgrounds, whose rate is clearly higher than that of other groups. The review cautions that background-country groups are internally heterogeneous and that figures for small groups can be swayed by individual cases.
According to Statistics Finland, youth with a foreign background are overrepresented as suspects in robbery crimes. The share grew significantly in 2019. The statistics highlight backgrounds from Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Asia.
Domestic violence — perpetrator background
Domestic violence cannot be explained by one background variable, but the background data does not support an evenly distributed pattern. Police data reported by MTV put foreign-background suspects at nearly half (45–50%) in Espoo, and Statistics Finland's 2024 victim data show a foreign-background victim share clearly above population share.
Police expressed concern over the rising share of foreign-background domestic violence suspects. In Espoo about 45–50% of domestic violence suspects were of foreign background — while foreign-background residents make up about 22% of Espoo's population.
In 2024 about 13,000 domestic violence offences were recorded; 76% of suspects were men. In cases where the victim was foreign-background, the suspect was also foreign-background in 72.1% of cases (compare: when the victim was Finnish-background the suspect was Finnish-background in 88.8%). Share of foreign-background victims: 19% (2023) and 18% (2024) — clearly above their population share (10%).
When an immigrant living in Finland commits a violent crime, intimate partner violence is statistically the most common type of crime. Published after the Sello mall shooting tragedy in Espoo, the article provides background on domestic and partner violence committed by immigrants.
FGM and honour-based violence
Female genital mutilation (FGM) is a criminal offence in Finland. THL estimates approximately 10,000 women and girls living in Finland have undergone FGM. Honour-based violence primarily affects immigrant communities — Statistics Finland's 2021 survey found one in ten Finns had witnessed or experienced it.
THL estimates that about 10,000 women and girls living in Finland have undergone female genital mutilation. An estimated 650–3,080 girls living in Finland are at risk. MAAMU study: 69% of Somali-background women and 32% of Kurdish-background women reported having undergone FGM.
EU Institute for Gender Equality report on the situation and trends of FGM in Finland — includes risk-group estimates, legislation and prevention measures.
About 10% of Finns aged 16–74 have witnessed or experienced honour-based violence. More than one in ten people under 35 know at least a victim or perpetrator or have experienced it themselves. About 1% have been married against their will.
Foreign prisoners
The number of foreign prisoners has grown 75% over the past ten years. In 2025, the daily average was 839 foreign-national inmates — 23.6% of all prisoners. Citizenship is not the same metric as foreign background, but nearly one in four prisoners is still a foreign national.
Criminal Sanctions Agency statistics 2025: 839 foreign prisoners per day (23.6% of the prison population), 78 nationalities. Growth +22% on the previous year. Largest groups: Estonia (112), Iraq (65), Sweden (64), Albania (44), Lithuania (43), Romania (42), Somalia (29). Narcotics offences 49.1% and sexual offences 20.6% as the principal offence.
Vantaa prison sees 60 nationalities a year; about 50% of remand prisoners are foreign. National trend: about 20 foreign prisoners in 1990 → 839 in 2025. 75% growth in ten years.
Foreign-background residents are about 10% of Finland's population but 23.6% of the prison population. The overrepresentation is 2.5–3×. The number of foreign prisoners rose +22% in a year and +75% in ten years.
Diversity and cohesion
Social cohesion does not arise by itself. The link between ethnic diversity and trust, the values of Europe's Muslim communities, and traditions such as cousin marriage show how deep the cultural differences accompanying immigration can be — and how slowly they level out.
Ethnic diversity and trust — the research evidence
Multiculturalism is often presented as automatically increasing trust. The research evidence tells a different story: ethnic diversity is associated in many datasets with lower local trust and weaker cohesion unless institutions and shared norms are unusually strong. This is not a slogan but a measurable risk.
Europe
- As immigration increases, social trust declines; both cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis confirm the result.
- Economic recession and ethnic polarization further strengthen the negative effect.
- Published in Social Forces (Oxford University Press).
- Ethnic and religious diversity in the neighborhood lowers trust in neighbors.
- Negative or distant contact with people from different backgrounds makes the situation worse.
- Published in Social Science Research.
United States
- Data: the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (2000) — about 30,000 interviews across 41 US communities; ethnic diversity measured with a Herfindahl index.
- Trust in neighbours collapses with diversity: in ethnically homogeneous communities (e.g. rural South and North Dakota) 70–80 % said they trusted their neighbours 'a lot', whereas in the most diverse cities (Los Angeles, San Francisco) only about 30 % did.
- The more ethnically diverse a residential area is, the less people trust one another — including members of their own racial/ethnic group. Yet the gap between in-group and out-group trust stays completely uncorrelated with diversity (R²=0.000): only the overall level of trust falls. This refutes both 'contact theory' (contact should raise trust) and 'conflict theory' (diversity should strengthen in-group trust); Putnam calls the pattern 'constrict theory'.
- Scale of the effect: Putnam's own comparison finds the neighbour-trust gap between homogeneous Bismarck, North Dakota and diverse Los Angeles is roughly as large as the gap between areas with 7% versus 23% poverty rates, or between 0% and 36% college-educated residents.
- In diverse areas, people vote less, do less volunteer work and give less to charity, participate less often in community activity, have fewer close friends, and report lower happiness and quality of life. Confidence in local government and local news media, and belief in one's own influence, are likewise lower, and TV-watching is higher — but political interest and participation in protests are, conversely, higher. Organizational and religious participation, by contrast, is not reduced by diversity once other factors are controlled for.
- "Hunker down" effect: people withdraw into themselves and social isolation increases.
- The effect appears across all racial groups, not only the majority.
- The result holds after controlling for age, education, income, homeownership, poverty, crime, income inequality, population density and commuting time — so it isn't simply poverty or crime in disguise. The effect was negative in 39 of the 41 communities studied, and was independently confirmed using a separate dataset covering all 3,111 US counties. The pattern showed no generational difference: Americans raised in the 1970s were affected by diversity just as much as those raised in the 1920s.
- Putnam is one of the best-known social scientists and the author of Bowling Alone.
- Putnam's paper included an optimistic hypothesis: in the long run, societies can forge new, more encompassing shared identities that overcome diversity's negative effects ('long-run amelioration'). This was a theoretical prediction, however, with no empirical support presented in the paper.
- Subsequent longitudinal research has not validated this optimism. Laurence & Bentley (2016), using an 18-year panel, found that sustained exposure to diversity reinforces withdrawal rather than reducing it. Replications of the Putnam effect across multiple countries have consistently confirmed the negative trust impact without the predicted recovery.
Australia
- In ethnically diverse areas, social cohesion and neighborhood interaction weaken, consistent with Putnam's "hunkering down" effect.
- The effect is stronger among the native population than among immigrants.
- Published in Journal of Urban Affairs.
United Kingdom
- Data: British Household Panel Survey, three waves (1991, 2001, 2011), 13,236 person-year observations. Diversity measured with Simpson's diversity index (0–1), using 1991-census wards as the community unit (mean population about 5,300).
- In fixed-effects models, an increase in local ethnic diversity lowered the probability that a resident said they liked their neighbourhood — coefficient −3.92 (p<0.001) across the full sample, and −3.85 (p<0.05) among those who stayed in place.
- The largest effect was among people who moved from a more diverse to a more homogeneous area: their attitude improved markedly (coefficient −12.32, p<0.01). No significant effect was found for people who moved from a more homogeneous to a more diverse area (coefficient −0.49, not significant) — suggesting this group had already self-selected into tolerance of diversity.
- Attitudes were generally stable across the dataset: only 14% of respondents reported a change in their answer between waves.
- The longitudinal, fixed-effects design minimises selection bias and supports a stronger causal interpretation than cross-sectional data.
- Published in European Sociological Review (open access, CC-BY).
International
- Genetic and cultural population diversity, especially migration history, correlates strongly with internal conflict, unrest, and distrust.
- Moving diversity from the 10th to the 90th percentile raises the probability of internal conflict in a five-year window from 18 % to 34 %, and the annual probability of conflict onset from 1 % to 4 %.
- For within-group (factional) conflicts, the same shift raises the annual probability from 6 % to as much as 60 %.
- The full model explains about 36 % of the cross-country variation in conflict frequency; diversity's own partial R² is about 5 %.
- The analysis covers both historical and present-day data.
- Published in Econometrica.
Views of Europe's Muslims
No equivalent values surveys have been conducted in Finland. It is often argued that immigrant communities do not form enclaves with values that differ from the native population, or that their values converge with those of their new home country over time. That can happen to some extent, but certain communities – Muslims in particular – still hold views that are markedly more conservative than the native population's. Since no Finnish data exists, the surveys below from elsewhere in Europe give a picture of this immigrant population's views.
United Kingdom
- 26% consider the Israel-Palestine conflict the most important election issue, compared with 3% of the general population.
- 47% think Jews have too much power over British government policy, compared with 13% of the general population. The figure is 53% among men and higher among men aged 18-34.
- Only 25% believe Hamas committed murder and rape on 7 October 2023; among 18-34-year-olds, 53% believe Hamas did not.
- 46% sympathize more with Hamas than with Israel, compared with 27% of the general population and 53% among 18-34-year-olds.
- 25% believe Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish homeland, while 57% disagree.
- 63% want prayer rooms in public non-religious spaces, compared with 10% of the general population.
- 65% want Eid al-Fitr to be an official public holiday, compared with 21% of the general population.
- 57% want mandatory halal food in schools and hospitals.
- 52% want to ban showing images of the Prophet Muhammad, compared with 16% of the general population.
- Only 23% consider sharia law undesirable, compared with 60% of the general population.
- 35% consider legalizing polygamy undesirable, compared with 70% of the general population.
- 28% consider banning homosexuality undesirable, compared with 62% of the general population.
- Younger Muslims aged 18-34 and more educated Muslims are more radical on most questions.
- 34% would report to police if someone close to them were going to join circles supporting terrorism in Syria.
- 32% do not condemn violence against people who mock the Prophet Muhammad (18% sympathise, 14% take no position).
- 66% fully condemn stoning for adultery.
- 31% accept that a British Muslim man may have more than one wife.
- 23% support introducing sharia law in some areas of Britain.
- 39% agree that wives should always obey their husbands.
- 52% do not believe homosexuality should be legal in Britain.
- 47% do not consider it acceptable for a homosexual person to work as a schoolteacher.
- 43% support introducing parts of sharia law, for example in civil and financial disputes, in Britain.
- 53% want to integrate fully with non-Muslims in every area of life.
- 71% feel that their local mosque represents their views.
- 53% want to send their children to schools with strong Muslim values.
- 44% support schools being able to require a hijab or niqab as part of the dress code.
- 52% would report to police if someone close to them were going to join circles supporting terrorism in Syria.
- 26% deny the existence of extremism in Muslim communities altogether.
France
- The French Interior Ministry's May 2025 report documents the activities of organisations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) in France.
- It maps mosques, schools, associations, and political networks connected to the Brotherhood.
- Authorities regard the Muslim Brotherhood as a significant vector of Islamism in Europe, though it is not formally banned.
- The report is the French state's first systematic public mapping of Brotherhood-linked structures in the country.
- 44% would place religious rules ahead of French law in certain situations, up 16 percentage points since 1995.
- 46% support applying sharia in France either fully or partly.
- 38% accept all or some Islamist positions, up from 19% in 1998.
- 33% feel sympathy for at least one Islamist current: Muslim Brotherhood 24%, Salafism 9%, Wahhabism 8%, jihadism 3%.
- Among young people, 32% feel close to the Muslim Brotherhood.
- Among women aged 18-24, 45% wear the hijab, up from 16% in 2003.
Austria
- 65% of Muslim youth hold that Islamic rules apply to all areas of life and must be strictly observed.
- 53% hold that women should wear a headscarf in public.
- 41% place religious rules above Austrian law.
- 43% blame the West for the problems of the Islamic world.
- The study's central — and largely overlooked — finding: algorithm-driven social media use is the single strongest predictor of antidemocratic attitudes, stronger than ethnicity, education or religion alone. Intense religious online engagement correlates with political-religious authoritarianism (r = 0.46), acceptance of violence (r = 0.33) and patriarchal gender views (r = 0.28).
- 49.4% of pupils in Vienna's public middle schools (Mittelschule) are Muslim.
- 42% of all public school pupils are Muslim, up from 41.2% the previous year.
- Catholics 16.66% (down from 17.5%), Orthodox 14.18%, no religious affiliation 23.24%.
- Private schools: 7.6% Muslim; all schools combined: 38.3% Muslim.
- 24.7% hold negative or intolerant attitudes.
- 32.8% show some degree of discriminatory attitude toward other religions.
- 10% consider their own religion superior; among Somalis the figure is dramatically higher at 56.1%, compared with 11.1% among Sudanese and 7.5% among West Africans.
- 52.3% consider Quran teaching more important than ordinary schooling: 63.3% of men and 38.3% of women.
- 52.8% accept that a Muslim woman may choose her own spouse; men are clearly more reserved at 36.6%.
- 18% said Islamic legal rules should replace Austrian law.
- 61% saw Islam primarily as a private matter.
- 25% wanted Islam to have a more visible role in society.
- 5% wanted Islam to dominate the legal system and the state.
- About 50% of Muslim youth aged 14-25 showed antisemitic attitudes.
Germany
- 45,1 % alle 40-vuotiaista muslimeista osoittaa avoimia tai latentteja islamistisia asenteita: 11,5 % selvästi islamistisia ja 33,6 % latentteja.
- 29,1 % osoitti avointa antisemitismiä.
- 25,1 % katsoo, että Koraanin sääntöjen tulisi mennä Saksan lain edelle.
- 23,8 % pitää islamilaista valtiota parhaana hallintomuotona.
- Taustaa: muslimiväestön mediaani-ikä on n. 32 vuotta (koko väestö ~44 v.); Saksassa arvioidaan olevan 2,5–3,5 miljoonaa 18–40-vuotiasta muslimia. MOTRA on liittovaltion ministeriöiden rahoittama ekstremismin seurantaverkosto; samat islamismi- ja antisemitismiluvut on raportoitu myös BKA-tutkimuksena.
A BKA study found that 45.1% of Muslims under 40 in Germany harbour latent or open sympathy for Islamism (Sharia over the constitution); 11.5% hold manifestly Islamist attitudes. Antisemitic attitudes among young Muslims rose sharply from 11.3% (2021) to 29.1% (2025).
Consanguineous marriage worldwide
Consanguinity is not a fringe phenomenon everywhere. Consang.net's map compiles country and regional research estimates for unions between biological relatives, usually to second cousins or closer. The map shows the percentage compiled to country level by the source: useful as a risk map, not as a current official population register and not as a judgement on individuals.
International
- The table metric is Consanguinity(%): the share of unions where spouses are biological relatives; in practice the source usually compiles estimates up to second cousins or closer.
- The material is not a uniform current statistic. It includes registries, hospital samples, household surveys, and community-level studies from different decades.
- The highest country-level compiled values cluster in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia; most European and American countries are low or zero in the source layer.
- Map geometry is generated locally from Natural Earth's 1:110m country polygons; the browser does not load an external map library or map data.
Opinion and politics
Immigration divides opinion — and at the same time reshapes politics itself, as voting behaviour differs sharply between population groups.
Public opinion on immigration
Finnish attitudes toward immigration are divided: a majority wants stricter immigration policy and believes public debate avoids discussing the problems — while labour-based immigration is broadly supported. The surveys below are the most comprehensive published.
Finland
- Although Finland's Muslim population is growing, Finnish attitudes toward Muslims have remained essentially unchanged — researcher Hanna Salomäki: 'no habituation to Islam has occurred'.
- Only about 25% held an at-least-fairly-positive view of Muslim women's hijab; fewer than one in ten (under 10%) viewed the burqa positively.
- Nearly 60% felt that everyone should be free to wear religious symbols.
- More than a third (over 33%) viewed mosques fully or fairly negatively — the same share in 2015 and 2022.
- Among under-30s, about one in three (33%) viewed mosques positively.
- 51% consider that Finland accepts too many refugees.
- 50% support tightening immigration policy.
- 60% feel that public debate does not dare to discuss the problems of immigration.
- 81% want Finland to actively recruit educated foreign professionals.
- 55% would support making it easier for foreigners to move to Finland — the highest figure in the 25-year measurement history.
- 40% assess that immigration harms Finland's economy.
- A majority of Finns (57%) favour tighter immigration restrictions.
- 30% consider the current level of immigration appropriate.
- Only 8% would like to see more immigration.
- Attitudes have hardened notably compared with surveys from the early 2010s.
Political effect
Immigration also has a political dimension: foreign-language voters far more often support parties that advocate a more permissive immigration policy, and these parties are predominantly left-leaning. A Taloustutkimus survey (2025) shows that the most popular party among foreign-language speakers, by a wide margin, is the Social Democrats (SDP) at nearly 50%. Note that while the publication is by the think tank Suomen Perusta with its own viewpoint, the underlying survey itself was carried out by Taloustutkimus, an established and respected polling firm. Helsingin Sanomat's own Taloustutkimus poll (2026) reached the same conclusion: the SDP was foreign-language speakers' most popular party.
Political participation is markedly lower among people with a foreign background. In the 2025 municipal elections turnout was 55.2% among people of Finnish background but only 22.2% among those of foreign background — a 33.0 percentage-point gap. By language group, Swedish-speakers voted most actively (65.2%) and foreign-language speakers by far the least (22.4%).
The asylum system
The asylum system is presented as the pinnacle of humanitarian responsibility — a way to save lives and offer protection to the persecuted. Most applicants, however, do not meet the criteria for international protection, the system does not reach the world's poorest, and brain drain leaves source countries worse off than before.
Recognition rates and protection need
The EU asylum system rejects most applications: in 2025 the first-instance recognition rate was 39%, falling to 21% in final decisions after appeal. By the system's own criteria, nearly four in five applicants are therefore found to have no protection need. Recognition rates vary sharply by nationality, and applicants move within the EU towards the best benefits and highest approval odds.
A significant share of asylum seekers move within the EU from the first country of arrival to apply in a country with better benefits or a higher recognition rate. This so-called asylum shopping burdens the Dublin system, places a disproportionate load on southern border states, and undermines solidarity among member states.
Legal analysis of the EU Dublin system. Secondary movements — applicants relocating from the first country of arrival to other member states — are a direct consequence of the Dublin Regulation's failure to build genuine burden-sharing solidarity. Countries with better benefits or higher recognition rates attract more applicants. The problem is structural and cannot be solved by enforcement alone.
Politico analysis of EU efforts to stop so-called asylum shopping — the phenomenon in which asylum seekers move from country to country to apply where benefits are highest or approval odds are greatest. The Dublin Regulation requires claims to be processed in the first country of arrival, but in practice the system does not work: applicants continue their journeys and lodge applications in multiple countries, placing an excessive burden on Mediterranean border states.
About 39% of EU first-instance asylum decisions are positive — in final decisions after appeal the share falls to around 21%. More than half of applicants are therefore found by the system's own criteria to have no protection need. Recognition rates vary sharply by nationality: Syrians and Afghans are recognised at high rates, while applicants from many African and Asian countries fall below 10%.
Eurostat's official statistics on EU asylum decisions. Recognition rates vary sharply by nationality: Syrians (~90%) and Afghans (~70%) are recognised at high rates, whereas applicants from many West African, North African, and South Asian countries fall below 10–20%. There are also significant differences between member states — the same nationality can receive very different outcomes in different EU countries.
EU member states granted protection status to around 361,000 applicants in 2025 (an 18% fall from the previous year). The first-instance recognition rate was 39.1% — meaning more than 60% of applicants were rejected at first stage. In final decisions after appeal, the recognition rate fell to 20.9%. A large share of those rejected file appeals, clogging the system for years.
Comprehensive academic analysis of European asylum decisions 2003–2017. The average overall recognition rate was ~30% — but formal refugee status under the Geneva Convention was granted to only ~15%. Outside the crisis years 2015–16, more than half of applications were rejected at first instance. Recognition rates vary sharply: high for conflict countries (Syria, Eritrea), below 10% or even below 5% for many African and Asian countries. Hatton notes that many applicants do not meet the strict persecution criteria — findings suggesting a significant share of applications are economically motivated.
MPI's interactive data visualisation of asylum recognition rates in EU and EFTA countries 2008–2017. Shows how sharply approval rates vary both by country and by nationality: the same applicant can receive a completely different decision in different EU countries. This inconsistency suggests decisions are not based solely on the applicant's objective protection need but also on the receiving country's political and administrative practices.
Genuine refugee flows — such as those registered in UNHCR camps — typically have a broadly balanced gender and age profile of families, women, and children. By contrast, those crossing the Mediterranean to Europe show a clear male majority. According to UNHCR statistics, 58% of those who arrived across the Mediterranean in 2015 were adult men, 17% were women, and 25% were children. Frontex's Annual Risk Analysis reported the figure as high as 74% adult men in 2014. The skewed profile is one key indicator that a large share of the movement is economically motivated rather than purely humanitarian.
The EU border agency Frontex's annual risk analysis. Reports that in 2014 about 74% of those crossing the Mediterranean were adult men, 11% women, and 15% children. During the 2015 crisis peak the composition shifted as the Syrian civil war brought more families, but adult men remained the majority afterwards. Frontex emphasises that mixed flows contain both people genuinely needing international protection and economic migrants.
UNHCR's official tracking portal for maritime arrivals in Europe since 2016. Includes arrival counts by route, deaths and disappearances, and statistics per receiving country.
Eurostat's official database of asylum applicants by age and sex (migr_asyappctza). In December 2025, men aged 18–34 accounted for 38% of all first-time applicants — by far the largest single age-sex group. Historically, the male share was substantially higher during the 2015–16 crisis. The database enables comparison by country and year.
In 2016, 181,436 people arrived in Italy by sea (Italian Ministry of Interior statistics). Only 4,808 received formal refugee status under the Geneva Convention — just 2.65% of all arrivals. Of the 123,600 who applied for asylum, 60% (54,254) were rejected. About 57,800 did not apply for asylum in Italy at all but continued to other EU countries. The 2.65% figure uses a strict calculation: it compares Geneva-Convention refugee status with all arrivals, not only applicants. Broader measures that include subsidiary and humanitarian protection produce higher rates — but even then the majority of applications were rejected.
Fact-check of Italian Ministry of Interior (Viminale) statistics. The article works through different calculation methods: strict refugee status vs. all forms of protection, applicants vs. all arrivals. In 2014, about 38% of all sea arrivals applied for asylum in Italy; of those applicants, about 10% received refugee status and about 50% received some form of protection. At the same time, about 62% of applications were rejected. Open Migration criticises the narrow 2.65% figure — yet it confirms the same underlying data.
The Italian Ministry of Interior's official immigration statistics portal: the daily cruscotto statistico contains data on sea arrivals, asylum applications, and decisions. This is the primary source cited by Il Sole 24 Ore (April 2017) in reporting that only 2.65% of 2016 arrivals received formal refugee status.
Migration and global poverty
Humanitarian migration does not reach the world's poorest — and structurally cannot: reaching Europe costs thousands of euros, which people in extreme poverty cannot afford. The EU receives about one million applicants a year, while 700 million people live in extreme poverty. Those who leave are moreover often among their countries' most educated, so migration drains human capital from the countries that need it most.
The number of asylum applications received by the EU (~1 million/year) is less than 0.15% of the world's 700 million people living in extreme poverty. Globally there are 123 million forcibly displaced people — European asylum channels reach only a fraction of them.
At the end of 2024 there were 123.2 million forcibly displaced people worldwide (refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced). The vast majority stay in nearby regions or their own country. Only hundreds of thousands reach Europe each year — the Western asylum system covers barely 1% of global forced displacement.
Around 700 million people live in extreme poverty worldwide (below $2.15/day in 2017 PPP). The EU receives about one million asylum applicants per year — less than 0.15% of those in extreme poverty. Immigration cannot mathematically solve world poverty.
The EU Asylum Agency's annual report: the EU receives around one million asylum applicants per year — a negligibly small share of the world's 123 million forcibly displaced. The system is designed to handle the margin, not to solve global poverty or displacement.
Comprehensive overview of global poverty figures by region. Poverty is highly concentrated: the vast majority of those in extreme poverty live in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia — regions from which asylum migration to Europe is proportionately low.
About 997,000 asylum applications were filed in the EU in 2024 (first-time ~912,000). Relative to the world's 700 million in extreme poverty or 123 million forcibly displaced, the European asylum system reaches only a fraction of global need.
Africa loses ~20,000 professionals per year to emigration. 36 of the 57 countries with a critical health-workforce shortage identified by the WHO are in Africa. Africa carries 24% of the global disease burden but has only 3% of the world's health workers. Training a doctor costs $20,000–$60,000 — an investment whose benefit is captured by the receiving country.
Analysis of Africa's health-worker losses: a colonial-era pattern continues as educated Africans are systematically recruited to Europe and North America. This worsens already critical resource shortages where the need is greatest.
BMJ article: Nigeria has lost thousands of doctors to emigration — the UK is the largest destination. Nigeria's health sector faces a critical staffing shortage while Europe benefits from its trained workforce. Billions in training investment are lost annually.
Peer-reviewed Lancet article on the scale and effects of health-worker brain drain. Nigeria's doctor-to-population ratio is only ~3.9 per 10,000 (WHO minimum recommendation: 10 per 10,000). Billions in training investment are lost annually as doctors and nurses are systematically recruited to Europe and the USA.
WHO report: Africa loses ~20,000 professionals per year to emigration. 36 of the 57 countries with a critical health-workforce shortage identified by the WHO are in Africa. Africa carries 24% of the global disease burden but has only 3% of the world's health workers. Training a doctor costs $20,000–$60,000 — an investment whose benefit transfers to the receiving country.
Stanford summary of the scale and consequences of brain drain: developing countries invest heavily in training healthcare workers who are then recruited to rich countries. Receiving countries save hundreds of millions in training costs while sending countries suffer critical skills shortages.
Classic study quantifying the scale of brain drain: in many small low-income countries, over 30–50% of university-educated nationals live in OECD countries. A dramatic loss of human capital — developing countries finance training that benefits primarily the receiving rich countries.
People smuggling and boat arrivals
Illegal migration into Europe is organised through smuggling routes run by criminal networks. UNHCR tracks maritime arrivals officially — the Mediterranean and the English Channel are key routes. Smuggling networks use violence against both migrants and local residents.
Safety at asylum reception centres
Finnish Immigration Service data from 2018 documents violence against reception centre staff and between residents. Up-to-date aggregate statistics are not published openly.
According to Finnish Immigration Service data, in early 2018 reception centres recorded 10–15 reports per month of violence or threats against staff, and 20–60 reports per month of violence between residents (including self-harm). The figures covered both verbal threats and physical assaults.
Reception-system costs
The cost of the reception system tracks applicant numbers with sharp swings: from about €54 million in 2014 to the 2016 crisis peak of €607 million, down to €100 million in 2021, and back to roughly €350–360 million in 2022–2024 with temporary protection for Ukrainians. The figures are realised expenditure from the state's final accounts.
- The chart covers purchased reception services (moment 26.40.21) and allowances paid to clients (26.40.63). It does NOT include the operating costs of the Immigration Service and state-run reception centres (26.40.01, ~€76–104M/yr in 2022–2024), since that moment also funds the agency's other administration, nor the integration compensations paid to municipalities (covered in the Integration section).
- Costs lag applicant numbers: the autumn 2015 asylum wave shows up mainly in the 2016 accounts (€530M + €78M).
- The 2022–2024 level (~€340–360M/yr) is driven mostly by temporary protection for those fleeing Ukraine; the caseload peaked at ~44,000 clients (2023).
- The 2025 budget (~€239M) and 2026 proposal (~€99M) anticipate a steep decline as reception capacity is wound down — they are budgeted appropriations, not actuals, and are therefore not drawn in the chart.
Ylen MOT-toimituksen selvityksen mukaan Maahanmuuttoviraston kilpailuttamatta ostamien vastaanottopalvelujen menot olivat yli 550 miljoonaa euroa vuosina 2022–2023. Hankintoja tehtiin suorahankintoina poikkeustilanteeseen vedoten Ukrainasta paenneiden vastaanoton kasvaessa.
VM:n virkamiesselvitys vuosien 2015–2016 turvapaikanhakija-aallon kustannuksista: vastaanoton menojen ohella arvioidaan kotouttamisen, sosiaaliturvan ja koulutuksen kustannuksia sekä pidemmän aikavälin julkistaloudellisia vaikutuksia. Virallinen kokonaiskatsaus kriisivuosien hintalapusta.